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THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD:
TRADITION OF INEFFICIENCY
By DAVID

UELMENt

T HAS become a truism to say that the Railway Labor Act was adopted
and amended against a background of an industry which was, for the
most important part, already organized. There existed a limited number of
unions representing operating employees and a somewhat larger number of
unions representing the non-operating employees, particularly those engaged
in the various traditional crafts. Many of the smaller unions of non-operating employees disappeared with the full enforcement of the union shop provisions that amended the Railway Labor Act in the early 1950's. More
recently, a merger of four of the five operating Brotherhoods has resulted
in the formation of one new organization called the United Transportation
Union!
Although the Railway Labor Act was amended, perhaps prematurely,
to include airlines, the more numerous and more serious representation disputes have not occurred in the effort to organize unorganized employees.
Rather, the bitterly contested disputes have involved employee desire to
change from one bargaining agent to another.
Historically, there was some interchange between certain classes of employees represented by operating Brotherhoods in instances where firemen
and engineers, because of their job assignments, were compelled to change
from one assignment to another depending upon available work. This
exchange also occurred between the yard brakemen and the road brakemen. These interchanges caused conflicts between the Switchmens' Union
of North America and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and between the Engineers' Brotherhood and Firemens' Brotherhood.
The representational aspects of these conflicts were fought out under a
set of rules that were well established, and usually involved a vote conducted by the National Mediation Board, the real purpose of which was
to determine which union was to "hold the contract."
However, even the vote did not eliminate all of the problems. In the
operating Brotherhoods the practice of permitting employees to hold membership in any one of the five operating Brotherhoods, including a Brotherhood that had no contract at all with the carrier, was still maintained. To
some extent these "fat" practices were being eliminated prior to the merger.'
It might be an over-simplification, yet it appears that these practices
t Ph.B., Marquette University; LL.B., University of Wisconsin. Partner, Goldberg, Previant
& Uelmen, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1 This merger should quiet the waggish reference made by some to the "Cooperating
nonoperating Brotherhoods" and the "Non-cooperating, operating Brotherhoods."
' Dirks v. Birkholz, 391 F.2d 289, vacated, 37 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. May 26, 1969).
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were developed and tolerated only so long as they were all kept within the
"family" and no "outsiders" were present.'
One of the more recent efforts in the railway freight industry was a
confrontation between the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks
(BRAC) and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) involving
units of employees working for Railway Express (REA). Historically, the
Teamsters Union negotiated contracts covering units of truck drivers working for REA in eight large metropolitan areas of the United States. The
BRAC negotiated contracts with REA on a system-wide basis. There were
approximately 35,000 eligible voters of which 3,200 were members of the
Teamsters. The BRAC filed a petition for a system-wide election with the
National Mediation Board, including those units represented by the Teamsters. The tally showed 17,867 for the BRAC and 10,192 for the Teamsters.
The election petition was filed in March, and after contested proceedings, the Mediation Board issued its decision in September. That decision
set no specific date for the election. On 8 October the parties were informed
that the election would be held no later than 4 November and perhaps
earlier. The eligibility list was to be supplied on 15 October. 34,000 names
and addresses, involving 8,000 separate locations, were furnished to the
Teamsters by the NMB. On 22 October an additional 900 names and
addresses, omitted from the original list, were furnished the IBT. On 28
October an additional 1,100 names and addresses were furnished to the
IBT. On 31 October the ballots were mailed. Thousands of the addresses
furnished to the IBT were incorrect. In addition, the IBT had reason to
believe that of the 35,000 eligible voters, only approximately three-fourths
of that number were actively employed by the company on the date of
the election. Recitation of these facts requires no additional comment from
me at this time.
The purpose of this speech is not to fully discuss the ramifications of the
disputed procedures used in that election. Suffice it to say, for our purposes here, the Teamsters came away from that election with substantial
grievances against the procedures employed by the NMB. It should also
be noted that the dissatisfied employees are now making a new effort to
change bargaining agents.
The right of employees to change from one union to another must, of
course, be balanced with the right of the employer and the public to expect reasonable stability in the collective bargaining relationship. The National Mediation Board has balanced these interests by permitting an election to be conducted no more often than once every two years.
It should be remembered by all interested persons that the right to
change from one union to another is no less important than the right to
select or reject a bargaining agent where none exists. Employees have a
right to organize and bargain through "representatives of their own choosing." Nothing in the statute, nothing in the legislative history and nothing
in the decisions of the Court-or indeed of the NMB-state that employees
3Pennsylvania Railroad v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480 (1956).
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once having selected a bargaining agent, cannot change that agent or
abandon collective bargaining entirely if they so desire. But can it be
forthrightly stated by those who are experienced in this field that the
practices and procedures that have been adopted, and are being used, permit employees to make these moves if that be their desire? The history of
proceedings before the NMB on this problem has not been comforting.
First, there is no decertification procedure in the Statute, and the NMB
probably is powerless to establish such a procedure. I do not share the fear
of some concerning the addition of such a procedure. Decertification, while
occasionally occurring under the National Labor Relations Act, has not
been a serious problem to the militant unions. Employees want and need
representation; and they desire to deal with their employers on a collective
rather than an individual basis. The size of the bargaining units themselves
are a substantial deterrent to a change in representation. Although I advocate no change in those policies at this time, I mention it to illustrate
that this fact alone provides a built-in protection for the existing certified
union. Changing unions in a system-wide unit of 8,000 employees, covering a wide geographical area of the United States and elsewhere, is a
formidable task which ought not be further frustrated by unreasonable
showing of interest rules, hocus pocus as to whether names of claiming
unions should be on the ballot, erroneous names and addresses and rushed
procedures which fail to afford all employees the opportunity to intelligently act on the ballot.
Second, a petitioner seeking to change the bargaining agent must secure
authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the unit, and the
practices here leave much to be desired. In the REA case there were at
least 4,000 "furloughed" employees, and probably many more who were
not actively employed by the company at the time of the election. The
erroneous facts reported to the Teamsters made communication with the
voters impossible. The timing of the election and the timing of the presentation of the list of eligible voters made any investigation of the list impossible.
Third, the challenging union, if certified, must accept the contract negotiated by the prior union for the term of that contract. This procedure
has led, in at least one case, to the absurd result of having an established
union, knowing that it will be defeated in the pending election, sign a
new long-term contract with the Carrier thus tying the challenging-and
about to be certified-union to its terms.
Fourth, the ad hoc procedures used by the Board tend to frustrate employee choice in many important cases.
In the Pan American election the BRAC had represented the employees
for many years prior to 1965. When the Teamsters filed its petition for
an election and the election was ordered, the incumbent, authorized bargaining agent (BRAC) insisted that its name be omitted from the ballot.
(Apparently, the BRAC was treating the certification of election procedures like a modified Missouri plan of judicial selection: If a majority
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did not vote for the Teamsters, the BRAC would expect to continue as the
bargaining agent.)
The 1965 election was sidetracked by some strange campaign tactics, and
a second election was conducted in 1966. Again the BRAC remained off
the ballot; but out of 6,936 eligible votes, the Teamsters received 3,091
votes. Write-ins for other unions moved the total number desiring representation to a majority. In this election the BRAC campaign asked employees to "tear up the ballot"; 3,000 employees did not cast votes. Perhaps
an uncertain percentage of these would not have voted anyway.
In both of those election proceedings, the Teamsters strongly urged the
NMB to compel the BRAC to be on the ballot, but the NMB refused.
However, instead of certifying the Teamsters after the second election,
the NMB decided that there was still confusion attributed to the BRAC
absence from the ballot, and it ordered a third election, as well as finally
ordering the BRAC to either go on the ballot or forfeit its right to represent the employees.
In the third election the Teamsters received 4,821 votes, the BRAC received 1,092 (out of 8,071 eligible). Again, approximately 25 per cent of
the employees failed to vote. Although certification was issued to the
Teamsters on 14 February 1969, it is interesting to note that a very thick
set of objections to certification were filed by the BRAC in this last election,
and their objections included the following:

Carrier interference by refusing to negotiate with the BRAC since the petition
was filed in 1965; NMB error in ordering the BRAC's name on the ballot;
general allegations concerning mediator errors in the handling of the eligibility lists; and bias in favor of the Teamsters.

The experiences in the Pan American election provide a fruitful base
for discussion and suggestions for improvements in the procedures of the
Board and, more importantly, in the statute itself. A change in the ballot
to provide a space for "no-union" is long overdue. However, while it would
be a worthwhile change, it is only one of the fundamental problems which
employees face in attempting to secure or reject union representation.
While the National Labor Relations Board found mail ballots to be an
undesirable method for representation elections, they nevertheless form the
keystone of NMB procedures.
The experiences of the Teamsters in the Zantop election deserve reporting here. Zantop is an air carrier of freight based in Detroit, Michigan.
The Teamsters secured an NMB election among the pilots, and a mediator
was assigned to set up the details of the election. The mediator traveled to
Detroit and held private conferences with the Teamsters and with the
carrier. Never did the Teamsters and the carrier meet face to face to resolve any of the eligibility problems which were presented. After taking
a statement of the position of each party the mediator decided the issue;
then went to a printer in Detroit and had ballots printed. He obtained
these ballots, went to a hotel room, wrote out the names and addresses of
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the eligible employees on the envelopes, and mailed the ballots to the employees.
Company supervisors went around to different employees and asked them
directly if they expected to vote for the Teamsters. If the employee said
"no," the supervisor picked up his ballot. Those ballots came into the possession of the carrier who was ineligible to participate in the election. The
employee, having surrendered his ballot to his employer for obvious reasons, now complained to the union, and, upon application, a new ballot
was sent from Washington. Now there were two ballots for this particular
employee.
Such a balloting procedure is far too disquieting for serious men to
continue to use. There may be a proper use for mail ballots for part of a
large unit of traveling employees. However, it is preferable to use the
experiences, procedures and controls formed by the NLRB on such matters.
The procedure that induces employees to refrain from voting at all, in
order to vote their choice, is certainly intolerable. In an election now being conducted by the NMB on Braniff Airways, an employee sent a letter
out to his fellow employees urging them to vote "no." The last paragraph of this letter states as follows:
One thing more-the Railway Labor Act is tricky, let's all be sure we know
how to vote no. I understand one sure way is to tear up your ballot.
In my opinion it is not only a poor practice, but it is unwise for a legal
procedure to incorporate and use such a confusing and burdensome rule.
Another serious problem involved with the NMB elections is that the
conduct of the parties, both the employer and the unions, is not controlled
or controllable by specific unfair labor practice procedures within the
jurisdiction of the NMB. The statute is specific: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its
employees ......
Without being held to specific statistics it is my opinion that the vast
percentage of unfair labor practices committed by employers under the
National Labor Relations Act-and there are thousands of those cases
yearly-are committed in connection with an organizing campaign where
either a union is attempting to come into the plant for the first time or
the employees are seeking to change unions, for these are the times of
greatest employer interest. These are the times when the employer expects
to, and does, express himself as to whether the employees should be organized, whether it is in their interest to be organized, and whether the
business enterprise will be aided or harmed by collective bargaining. It
just does not make sense to delegate authority to conduct representation
elections to an agency and at the same time withhold from that agency

the power to remedy any illegal acts which may occur during the election.
In Zantop, the pilots voted for the Teamsters Union but the union never
received certification. The employer and others made protests to the NMB,
some of which were referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
investigation. I do not have to tell you that an FBI agent calling at a mem-
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ber's home to investigate conduct affecting an election has something less
than an encouraging effect upon the employee's desires to be represented
for purposes of collective bargaining. I do not say that with any intention
of disparaging the FBI or any of its agents. But I think every person in
this room would agree that the NLRB investigations of such matters are
far less discouraging and far less coercive than an investigation conducted
by the criminal division of the federal government.
It may be that this type of activity also has a similarly coercive effect
upon the employer and its agents. Certainly, if conduct which is an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA is criminal under the Railway Labor Act,
the officers and agents of the Carrier will be more circumspect in their conduct. But this fact does not meet the issues of whether such coercion is
necessary, whether such coercion is desirable and whether such coercion
adds to or subtracts from the atmosphere of free collective bargaining that
we would like to see encouraged in the airline industry.
I do not advocate at this time that the Railway Labor Act be repealed.
I lean in that direction and I think that issue needs a serious dialogue and
discussion by all interested parties. Yet, I am definitely of the view that the
Railway Labor Act needs substantial revision. Perhaps its election procedures should be turned over to the National Labor Relations Board en
masse. Failing that, the Railway Labor Act should definitely be amended
to remove the airlines from coverage under that Act and they should be
placed under the National Labor Relations Act.
We all know the National Labor Relations Act is not perfect, and the
National Labor Board has had its ups and downs. There are substantial proposals pending in Congress, and have been for some time, to make revisions
in that law. Also, there have been proposals to establish labor courts; however, I think that the rail and airline industries could play an important
part in preventing any precipitous changes in our labor codes by Congress.
In order to do so both the responsible unions and the carriers have to have
some meaningful and forthright discussion on how to proceed from this
point.

